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APPELLANTS1 BRIEF FOR RE-HEARING 
STATEMENT 
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, fifom an adverse decision 
of an Honorable Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court, the 
Supreme Court in a unanimous decision written by Justice Hall, 
upheld the lower court ruling. Two of tlie appellants have filed 
a petition herein, pursuant to Rule 76 (e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, requesting this court td reconsider its decision, 
alleging in support thereof, that this honorable court erred in 
ruling, and/or failed to adequately consider certain arguments , 
raised on appeal. The petitioners restate, by reference, the 
facts as set forth in their original bri^f* 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
The appellants would urge the court to reconsider its 
decision of February 9, 1977, and to reverse said decision, 
either in wrhole or in part, as follows: 
1. To reverse the decision that the guardianship was a 
"nullity", and to allow the petitioners the benefit of a 
validly appointed guardian as a bar to the foreclosure of 
the subject mortgage, or that failing, then in the alternative; 
2. To divide the mortgage into the seven amounts set forth 
in the mortgage, and reduce the mortgage by the sum 
attributed to each of the defendants not counter-claiming 
herein. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RIGHT TO PETITION FOR REHEARING REQUIRES NO PRECEDING 
ACTS BY THE PETITIONERS. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows: 
"Within 20 days after the filing of the decision of the 
Supreme Court, either party may petition the court for a 
rehearing. The petition shall state briefly the points 
wherein it is alleged that the appellate court has erred. 
The petition shall be supported by a brief of the auth-
orities relied upon to sustain the points listed in such 
petition. Both the petition and brief in support thereof 
must be prepared in accordance with the requirements of Rule 
75(p), and shall be served upon the adverse party prior to 
filing." (Rule 76(e)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.) 
This rule requires the party requesting a rehearing to do the 
following: 
A. A petition for rehearing within twenty days. 
B. A brief to support the petition. 
C. To be done in accordance with Rule 75 (p) U.R.C.P. 
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Counsel for petitioners apologizes if the 
require or prefer that both the petition 
rule of the court would 
bnd brief in support of 
the petition, be filed simultaneous. Inasmuch as that procedure 
was not clear to this counsel, and he was under the impression 
that the brief could be filed later, coun|sel did so, and apolog-
izes to this court, and assures the courti, that the failure was 
not meant as either a discourtesy or an Attempt to delay these 
proceedings. 
There is nothing in the rules that rjequires a party to have 
either filed a response brief or to request oral arguments in 
order to petition for a rehearing. The right to request a 
rehearing is founded on the principle that a party is grieved by 
a decision of the Supreme Court, and reasonably believes that in 
making that decision, the court either failed to consider some 
material point, or that it erred in its conclusion, or that some 
matter has been discovered which was unknown at the time of 
original hearing. (See In re McKnight, 4 U 237, 9 P.299, Brown 
v. Piekard, 4 U. 292, 9 P.573, 11 P. 5121) 
It is so obvious- that a party cannot be grieved by a decision 
of the court until a decision is reachedL that for any person to 
argue or suggest that the failure to file a responsive brief or 
to request oral arguments is a waiver of I 
is incredulous. 
POINT II 
THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THESE DEFENDANT^ SHOULD NOT BE NULLIFIED 
BY OR IN THESE PROCEEDINGS. I 
The decision of this court would suggest that the appellants 
did not address themselves on appeal to (the ruling of the trial 
the right to a rehearing, 
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court regarding the "nullity" of the guardianship proceedings. 
Petitioners would suggest that in factf the trial court did not 
directly rule on the question of the "nullity" of the guardianship, 
that nevertheless, the appellants brief addressed itself in 
several particulars to the guardianship and the results of a 
"valid" guardianship on the mortgage in question and the relative 
rights of the appellants and the defendants by reason of the 
same. Inherent in the arguments of the appellants, was the fact 
that the appellants and the general public were entitled to both 
assume and presume that the guardianship proceedings were exactly 
what another division of the lower court had determined them to 
be, i. e., valid acts, and that if they were not valid, that the 
proper place to pursue the same was by the defendants against the 
guardian, in the guardianship file in that court. The question 
of the validity of that guardianship was not an issue before the 
lower court, (see Pre-Trial Stipulation), but rather, the parties 
stipulated: that a guardianship did in fact exist, (thus concluding 
or presuming the same valid); that the mortgage by the guardian 
to the defendants had never been included as an asset of that 
guardianship; and, that there was no record that it was or was 
not paid. When Ezilda Hendricks was appointed guardian, she was requi 
to post a good and sufficient surety, and only after due and 
proper notice was given and at a hearing duly held, with evidence 
introduced as required by law. That appointment was nearly 
fifteen (15) years old at the time of the commencement of this 
law suit. At that time, no person 6t party, including the 
defendants, were entitled to directly attack the guardianship 
proceeding due to the operation of the statute of limitations, or 
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laches, or by operation of law, except perhaps in the guardianship 
file itself. It thus seems improper for either this court or the 
trial court to determine in a separate and unrelated matter, that 
the guardianship was a "nullity", because the guardian failed to 
include a mortgage as part of the trust estate. It would seem to 
the appellants that the more proper course to follow would be for 
the court to determine that the guardian's actions relating to 
the mortgage were such that a cause of action might lie between 
the minors and their guardian, but that the effects of that 
failure or any other act, could not be tried in this proceedings, 
since to do so would be without the benefit of proper notice 
postings, etc., as required in guardianship matters, and with out 
ALL necessary persons being parties. 
The de facto result of the decision issued by this court, is 
to judicially void a guardianship proceedings, without due process 
of law. Thus, without properly pleading the acts leading to a 
conclusion that the guardianship was a nullity; without testimony 
on that issue; without proper service on ALL interested or 
required parties to the matter; without the required posting in 
guardianship matters, etc., the court has determined that the 
guardianship was a nullity. Such a result seems to be a patent 
error, and places innocent and interested third parties who have 
relied on the guardianship proceedings, in possible peril of 
their property rights. A person should be entitled to rely upon 
the prior decisions of the court that have consistently held that 
if minors have a duly appointed guardianJ that the statute of 
limitations will run as to said minors, by reason of the guardian. 
(See Parr v. Zions First National Bank 1^ Utah 2d 404, 375 P.2d 
461.) 
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In this particular fact situation, because of the court records, 
the appellants knew of the duly appointed guardian for most of 
the defendants; they knew that in 1967, that the guardian, who 
was the defendants1 mother, had attempted to quiet title to the 
subject property, and had failed; they were aware that this court 
had previously held that the appointment of a guardian caused the 
statute of limitations to run against minors, and that the "tolling" 
of the statute because of the disability of the minor, ended with 
the appointment of a guardian,. Should the opinion of the court 
remain unchanged, then the law in this state relative to the 
effect of the appointment of guardians shall of necessity undergo 
a radical change. Any person dealing with: a guardian; or, with 
property that any time involved a guardian; or, a person who may 
have had a guardian, will have to inquire or ascertain as to 
whether the guardian ever borrowed money from the minors or 
mortgaged property to the minors, because if such in fact occurred, 
and the guardian did not include the same in the inventory or 
repay the same, then the entire guardianship proceedings would be 
subject to being declared a nullity, in any proceedings and the 
third party would be placed in jeopardy and would act at his own 
peril. In the instant case, we have a situation where the guardians! 
has now been declared to be null and void, i. e., it never existed, 
and since this was done outside of the quardianship file itself, 
we have no idea of how many other persons or parties have relied 
upon that proceeding in their dealing with the guardian and the 
estate in the hands of the guardian, who may now also be hurt, or 
have their reliance on the existance of the guardianship, declared 
to be a "nullity.w If the guardianship proceeding is null or 
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void as to this matter, then surely the guardianship is completely 
voidf because it cannot be just a "littl^ bit" void, and notwith-
standing that determination by the court, there will be nothing 
in the guardianship file to indicate thati it has been judicially 
determined to be a nullity. In addition, what now happens to all 
other proceedings in that file and persons who have in good faith 
dealt with the guardian? The only consistent position is to 
declare those acts a nullity too. The result of such a decision 
is not only unconscionable, but is obviously wrong and unfair, 
for it has the same effect and produces the same results as an 
ex post facto law. The true remedy and recourse for the defendants 
and counter-claimants who did not have their mortgage timely foreclosed, 
should be against their guardian, whoeveq that guardian might be. 
While, as the court's decision suggests, lit is highly unlikely 
that a guardian would sue herself to foreclose the mortgage, it 
must be remembered that she did take certain oaths, and, just 
such a fact situation is undoubtedly one of the reasons why this 
state has adopted a statute requiring all guardians appointed by 
the court must post bond or surety, no matter who they are, or, 
the oath they take, before letters of guardianship will issue, 
to protect minors 
when a guardian will 
just as this guardian did. That bond is 
against just such an occurrence is had asl 
not sue herself. Because this guardian did not sue herself, and 
because these defendants chose not to sue their mother directly, 
or to even question her regarding her failure to "timely" 
foreclose their mortgage, should not be a\ reason for this court 
to change the law relative to the running of the statute of 
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limitations as to minors with duly appointed guardians. This 
"new" rule by the court will give all minors another way of 
accomplishing what they failed to do by neglecting to sue their 
guardian for failing to marshall their estate, etc., and has the 
effect of judicially altering the statutes regarding minors, 
their guardians, and limitation of actions, without the benefit 
of legislation. 
Appellants urge, that far more mischief will be done by the 
court declaring the guardianship to be a nullity due to the 
guardian's failure to marshall an asset of the estate, than good 
can possibly result from adopting such a new principle of law. 
IF we were considering only the guardianship proceeding, and ijf 
proper notices of the proceedings were sent to the parties involved 
in the proceeding, including the sureties of the guardian, and 
evidence was adduced for the express purpose of the minors attempt-
ing to void their guardianship by their mother, then perhaps the 
result reached by the court would be more palatable to the appell-
ants, and consistent with the prior rulings of this court. 
However, the only relevant stipulated facts before the court 
relative to> the guardianship was that "on March 19, 1958, Ezilda 
Hendricks was appointed by this court as guardian of her minor 
children. That guardianship action, Civil No. 1458, was funded 
from deposits of other moneys from the individual trust accounts 
with the Bureau, but said action did not list the mortgage as an 
asset." There was no stipulation or statement in the rest of the 
agreed facts that in any way questioned the validity of that 
guardianship proceedings, nor was any issue framed for trial 
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to suggest or would lead the court to coriclude that the "adminis-
tration of the guardianship estate was a |nullity." In fact, the 
lower court did not make a specific finding as to that point, nor 
is the decision of the trial court explicit in such a conclusion. 
Nevertheless, appellants feel that they reasonably objected on 
appeal, to any findings of the trial coui[t that would lead to the 
conclusion that the guardianship was a "ijullity", by appellants 
repeated arguments that there was, in facjt, a duly appointed 
guardian of the minor defendants from and after March 19, 1958. 
The mere fact that the file of the guardianship proceeding was 
not the file or action in issue before tljis court, should have 
been sufficient reasoning or basis for t\\e court to have refused 
to reach a conclusion that "the administration of the guardianship 
estate was a nullity." For that conclusion or decision of the 
court to stand, will, as previously urg^d, open all transactions 
previously approved by the court in the guardianship action, to 
being set aside or vacated, even though rfelied upon in good faith 
by other innocent third parties, including the surety of the 
guardian. That is the only logical result that can be expected 
from a conclusion that the guardianship Was a "nullity", unless 
of course it is just "a little bit null". 
Additional problems can also be assumed from such a conclusion, 
because according to the stipulated fact^, "In 1962 or 1963, 
First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., Trust Department, became the 
trustee of the defendants1 estates. The funds remaining in the 
hands of the guardian, Ezilda Van Hendridks, were turned over to 
that trustee....". Suppose that the mortgaged premises are now 
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sold to satisfy the judgment of foreclosure, and the proceeds 
from said sale are insufficient to satisfy the sum due and owing 
to the defendants, in such an event, will these defendants now be 
able to rely upon the authority of these proceedings and this 
decision to commence an action against First Security Bank for 
failing, as their duly appointed trustee, to marshall the assets 
of their estate, and have the court rule that after these many 
years that those proceedings were also a nullity, and that any 
and all transactions concluded or conducted by First Security in 
the proceedings relative to its acts as trustee, can now be set 
aside as a nullity and as if they had never been done? While the 
absurdity of such a result is evident, nevertheless, that very 
conclusion seems very analogous to the results that the decision 
reached by the court would obtain. For such a line of case law 
to develop in this state seems to be a very dangerous and improper 
thing and will leave all guardianship proceedings open to collateral 
and far-reaching attack, at any time, without regard to statutes, 
determinal reliance, laches, etc. Whether appellants directly 
addressed themselves to that matter in their brief, or whether 
the trial court went that far in its decision, seems to be secondary 
to the greater issue, of what will be the result if the precedent 
of such a decision should remain. Petitioners respectfully urge 
the Honorable Justices of this court to reconsider their decision 
relative to the same, and to conclude that although the guardian 
did act in a form and manner that was subject to having her 
removed as the guardian of the minors, that the proper method for 
her removal was pursuant to the terms of Title 75-6-1 and 75-13-9 
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of the Utah Code Annotated, and not by or] through an unrelated 
proceeding. Appellants believe and again assert that the real 
thrust of their appeal and the arguments raised in their brief 
was based upon the validity of the guardianship proceedings, and 
the belief in that validity was based upon the assumption that 
the guardian was properly appointed to serve, and that until she 
was removed in the manner prescribed by the statutes of this 
state, or, until a direct attack upon her administration was 
commenced in the guardianship proceedings itself, that she would 
continue to so serve* (See arguments contained in Point III of 
Appellants1 brief, which point contained leight of the fourteen 
pages of appellants argument.) 
In view of the foregoing, the petitioners respectfully urge 
the court to conclude*that the matter of 
guardianship proceedings was never beford the court; that the 
validity of the guardianship could not be attacked in this 
action, but only by the defendants properly filing a claim so as 
to make the guardianship file a part of the proceedings, or by 
filing in the guardianship file itself, thereby securing the 
posting and giving of the required notices, the joinder of all 
interested and essential parties, including the surety, the 
introduction of evidence on that particulc 
that to do less t^an that would cause a s|: 
departure from tt\e normal procedures and 
the statutes of this state, as well as cajuse no end of havoc and 
mischief. 
the validity of the 
ar issue, etc., and, 
ignificant and radical 
rules of this court and 
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POINT III 
A DEFAULTING DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT 
OF AN UNASSERTED COUNTER-CLAIM. 
The petitioners have little quarrel with the court's ruling 
that there may be situations where the "successful defense of 
some of several co-defendants may inure to the benefit of a 
defaulting defendant*" However, the petitioners urge that this 
seems to be inappropriate proceedings for the court to apply that 
conclusion. The defendants, as a group, are much more than just 
co-defendants in a law suit, where the defaulting defendants 
benefit or obtain a benefit from the defense of the defendants 
who do appear. Surely a counter-claim involving the ability to 
collect money or to foreclose a mortgage against property in lieu 
thereof, is much, much more than a defense to a claim of a plaintiff. 
Consider the following: 
First, only a part of the defendants asserted a counter-
claim, namely, Franklin Reed, Margaret Sue Reed, Cordie 
Mae Reed and LaWanna Kay Reed. 
Second, that fact would indicate or suggest that the other 
defendants did not wish to assert their claim under the 
mortgage, or that their claim had been satisfied. This 
seems particularly applicable where each of the mortgagees 
have a stated amount of contribution to the mortgagor, and 
the sum is identified in the mortgage instrument itself. 
Third, for the court to conclude that because part of 
the mortgagees claim that their contribution to the 
mortgage was not satisfied, that the other mortgagees 
giving the defaulting 
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claim was likewise not satisfied, is 
defendants far more than is either jiist or equitable 
The stipulated facts were that "(t)hdre is no record of 
payment or lack of payment by Ezilda and Charles Hendricks to the 
defendants of the subject mortgage." The petitioners did not 
enjoy that type of "relationship" with the defendants that would 
make them privy to that type of informatiqn. Surely, the defend-
ants, as brothers and sisters, had that type of information, and 
both those defendants who answered and those who did not answer, 
in effect did admit that the defendants not answering had no 
claim to assert. r£ the mortgagors had repaid any of their children, any 
part or all of their contribution to the mortgage, then the 
mortgagors would have been entitled to haye the mortgage reduced 
by the amount that they paid to their chi 
the petitioners, that the mere refusal of 
to answer the plaintiffs complaint, was ail admission that their 
portion of the contribution had been repaid to them. When the 
four answering brothers and sisters neglected to include their 
older brothers and sister in the counter-claim, was that a further 
acknowledgement that they considered the Contribution of their 
brothers and sister to have been repaid? 
that they are entitled to the presumption 
who did not counterclaim, had been satisfied as to their portion 
of the contribution to the mortgage. rF phe mortgage had merely 
recited that the mortgage was for an aggregate sum only, and had 
dren. It would seem to 
the three (3) defendants 
no reference to the contributions by each 
the result reached by the court would be understandable. However, 
The appellants urge 
that those defendants 
of the defendants, then 
where the stipulated facts and the mortgabe are as they are, L
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and where only four (4) of the seven (7) defendants wish to 
assert that the mortgage is unsatisfied, and bother to file a 
counterclaim to foreclose the same, then, in such event, the 
petitioners urge that it is more reasonable to conclude that the 
unpaid amount due on the mortgage is that sum contributed by the 
four that bothered to counterclaim, and that the other three are 
presumed to have been paid. 
Petitioners thus urge that the defaulting defendants, who 
did not file a counterclaim, should surely be barred from any 
recovery, and that neither law nor equity should allow the other 
defendants, the counter-claimants, to collect or secure judgment 
for the benefit of those defaulting defendants, who made their 
election to make no claim for contribution or otherwise. 
POINT IV 
APPELLATE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER BOTH THE STIPULATED 
FACTS AND THE LAW IN THIS PROCEEDING. 
Due to the unusal nature of the entire proceedings, and the 
obvious lack of appellants' personal knowledge regarding the 
dealings between the defendants and their parents, the facts were 
all stipulated to in writing at the trial of the matter. No 
witnesses were called, and none testified. The trial court thus 
had no opportunity to personally observe witnesses, their demeanor, 
their conduct, their believability, or lack of believability. It 
would seem, that on appeal, that the findings of fact, etc., by 
the lower court should be given no greater credence or effect than tha 
which could or might be reached by this court. This relates not 
only to the question of the foreclosure of the mortgage by part 
of the defendants, but as to the evidence or lack of evidence 
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before the court relative to the guardianship proceeding, for the 
stipulated facts should not be subject to that many different 
interpretations, since there were no witnesses for the trial 
court to personally scrutinize, etc. Petitioners thus urge this 
court to review its previous decision, and the decision of the 
lower court in light of the same. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners urge the court to reconsider its decision that 
the guardianship was a nullity, for the reason that such a 
decision was improperly reached and concluded in this proceeding, 
and, was not based upon facts sufficient 
If the court will reconsider its decisiori 
guardianship, then petitioners request tq 
sider the effect of that guardianship on 
closure of the mortgage, the statute of limitations, and the 
right of the petitioners to assert the ba|r of the statute of 
limitations to defendants foreclosure of 
In the event the court shall refuse 
decision on the "nullity" of the guardian! 
still submit that the court should recons 
to conclude the same. 
on the "nullity" of the 
is court to also recon-
the question of fore-
the same. 
to reconsider its 
ship, then the petitioners 
ider its1 decision as to 
the effect of that portion of the mortgage attributed to contributio 
by the three defaulting defendants, i.e., that the mortgage 
should be reduced by the amount of that contribution. 
Respectfully submitted, 
George M. Mangan, 
Attorney\ for Peti t iofrfers 
